We describe how one can use multivariate regression models and data collected by the National Research Council as part of its recent ranking of doctoral programs (Research-Doctorate Programs in the United States: Continuity and Change) to analyze how measures of program size, faculty seniority, faculty research productivity, and faculty productivity in producing doctoral degrees influence subjective ratings of doctoral programs in 35 academic fields. Using data for one of the fields, economics, we illustrate how university administrators can use the models to compute the impact of changing the number of faculty positions they allocate to the field on the ranking of their programs. Finally, we illustrate how administrators can "decompose" the differences between a department's rating and the ratings of a group of higher ranked departments in the field into difference due to faculty size, faculty seniority, faculty research productivity, and faculty productivity in producing doctoral students. This decomposition suggests the types of questions that a department and a university should be addressing if they are serious about wanting to improve the department's ranking. faculty seniority, faculty research productivity, and faculty productivity in producing doctoral degrees influence subjective ratings of doctoral programs in 35 academic fields. Using data for one of the fields, economics, we illustrate how university administrators can use the models to compute the impact of changing the number of faculty positions they allocate to the field on the ranking of their programs. Finally, we illustrate how administrators can "decompose" the differences between a department's rating and the ratings of a group of higher ranked departments in the field into difference due to faculty size, faculty seniority, faculty research productivity, and faculty productivity in producing doctoral students. This decomposition suggests the types of questions that a department and a university should be addressing if they are serious about wanting to improve the department's ranking.
I. Introduction
The recent National Research Council (NRC) rankings of doctoral programs in the arts, humanities, biological sciences, engineering, physical sciences and mathematics, and social and behavioral sciences has drawn considerable public attention.
1 Because it is the first major assessment of doctoral education undertaken in over a decade, its findings have been highlighted in the national media. 2 The study will undoubtedly be used by potential graduate students making application and acceptance decisions and by university administrators making resource allocation decisions. Thus, the study will influence, sometimes positively and sometimes negatively, doctoral programs at universities across the nation.
These rankings were obtained from a survey of over 16,700 graduate faculty members who were asked to rate each PhD program in their discipline on a scale of 0 (not sufficient for doctoral education) to 5 (distinguished). Each rater was provided with lists of the faculty members associated with each of 50 randomly chosen programs in the discipline and the number of new doctorates produced by each of the programs over the previous five-year period. Raters were asked to rate both the scholarly quality of each program's faculty and each program's effectiveness. The response rate to the survey was about 50 percent and the programs in each discipline were rated by at least 200 faculty members.
The NRC also collected a set of objective statistics about the seniority, research productivity, and productivity in producing doctoral degrees of program faculty. These data were not provided to raters. If one assumes, however, that raters were sufficiently knowledgeable about their profession that in making their ratings they acted as if they knew the objective measures, then one can use multivariate regression models to estimate the extent to which variations in the objective measures influence raters' decisions. That is, one can estimate hedonic models of the determinants of departmental ratings. 3 The resulting estimates can then be used to help guide resource allocation decisions at universities.
Why does one need such estimates? After all, the published NRC volume presented simple correlations between some of the objective measures and the subjective ratings of the raters. For example, program size, as measured either by the number of faculty associated with the program or the number of doctoral degrees granted by the program over the past five years, was shown to be positively correlated with the subjective ratings in most fields. However, when the objective measures are themselves correlated, as faculty size and degrees granted are, simple correlations do not permit one to learn the partial correlation of each objective variable with the subjective ratings. For example, they do not provide information about whether increasing faculty size, while holding constant the number of degrees granted, would be associated with a higher subjective rating. To answer such a question requires a multivariate analysis.
In this paper, we describe how one can use multivariate regression models
and the NRC data to analyze how measures of program size, faculty seniority, faculty research productivity, and faculty productivity in producing doctoral degrees influence raters' subjective ratings of doctoral programs in various academic fields. Using data for one of the fields, economics, we then indicate how university administrators can use the models to compute what the impact of adding one faculty position would be on the ranking of an economics department. The department chosen to illustrate the methodology is the Cornell economics department in which one of us has an appointment. Finally, we illustrate how administrators can "decompose" the differences between a department's rating and the ratings of a group of higher rated departments in the field into differences due to faculty size, faculty seniority, faculty research productivity, and faculty productivity in producing new doctorates. To illustrate the methodology we use the Cornell economics department and choose the top ten economics programs as the comparison group. This decomposition suggests the type of questions that the department and university should be addressing if they are serious about wanting to improve the department's ranking.
The methodology that we describe in the next section, statistically relating an outcome (in this case the subjective rating) to a set of objective measures and then inferring the effect of a change in any of the latter on the outcome, has a long tradition in economics. As noted above, it is commonly referred to as the "hedonic function" or "implicit price" approach. Implicit in the approach is the assumption that one can infer causality from such cross-section estimates. While there are other methodological approaches that are more appropriate for trying to infer causality when longitudinal or panel data are available, in the absence of these types of data we are restricted to the approach presented here. Hence, in what follows, we will assume in places that we can infer how a given change in any one of the objective measures would quantitatively influence a program's subjective rating. Readers unhappy with this assumption can view our work as purely descriptive.
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Here Ri is the rating of the scholarly quality of the faculty at institution i; Fj is the number of faculty associated with the doctoral program at institution i, the xji are the other objective characteristics assumed to influence program ratings (to be discussed shortly), ei is a random error term, and the aj are the parameters to be estimated.
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The estimated values of these parameters provide estimates of the marginal impact of a one-unit change in each objective variable on the subjective rating the doctoral program received, holding constant all other variables. The squared faculty size variable permits the relationship between rating and faculty size to be nonlinear. In particular, the marginal effect of an increase in faculty size by one on the faculty program rating, holding all the other variables in the model constant, is given by (2) ai + 2a 2 Fi.
As a result, if ai proves to be positive and &2 proves to be negative, as faculty size increases the program rating will first increase, but at a declining marginal rate. The rating will eventually reach a maximum at a faculty size equal to minus ai /2a2. Finally, the rating will decline as program size continues to increase beyond this faculty size.
The other variables (the x's) included in the analyses are the percentage of full professors (FULL), the percentage of program faculty with external research support (RESEARCH), publications per faculty member (PUBFAC), a measure of the dispersion of publications per faculty member, the GINI coefficient for publications per faculty member (GEMIPUB), the number of citations per faculty publication (CITEPUB), the number of PhD degrees granted per faculty member (PHDFAC), the number of PhDs granted per enrolled graduate student (PHDSTU) and the median number of years that it took new doctorates to receive their degrees (MEDTIME). 7 Publication data were not collected by the NRC for faculty in the arts and humanities. Hence, for these fields PUBFAC, GINIPUB, and CITPUB do not appear in the analyses. Instead, the NRC collected data for these fields on the total number of prestigious awards and honors won per faculty member (AWARDF), and this variable is included in the models for these fields. Implicit in the set of variables included in the model is the belief that the raters subjective ratings of a program are determined by the program's size, the seniority distribution of its faculty, its faculty members' research productivity, and their doctoral production productivity.
HI. Empirical Estimates
The estimated regression coefficients for each field that we obtained are found in tables 2A to 2E. 8 In all fields but one, there is a positive relationship between program rating and faculty size (FACULTY). However, typically, the coefficient of the square of faculty size (FACULTY2) is negative, implying that after some faculty size, further growth has a negative effect on ratings. 9 In most fields (but not in the majority of the biological sciences), increases in the proportion of faculty who are full professors (FULL) leads to higher ratings, presumably because cumulative accomplishments and name recognition are higher for full professors.
The three measures of faculty research productivity (RESEARCH, PUBFAC, CITPUB), all tend to be positively associated with the subjective ratings. In contrast, the dispersion in faculty productivity, GINIPUB, is statistically significantly negatively associated with ratings in the majority of fields. Since an increase in GINIPUB means an increase in dispersion, this implies that hiring both a "star" and a "lemon" whose average productivity is the same as that of existing faculty may decrease program ratings in these fields! In the arts and the humanities, the objective measure of faculty productivity (AWARDF) also is positively associated with the subjective ratings.
Measures of doctoral program success also matter. In about two-thirds of the fields, the greater the number of doctoral degrees produced per faculty member (PHDFAC), the higher the ratings tend to be. This implies that increasing the number of faculty associated with a program, without also increasing the number of degrees granted, will indirectly have a negative effect on program ratings in these fields. Finally, longer median times to degree (MEDTTME), which within a field typically are associated with programs with less financial support per graduate student, are also associated with more poorly rated programs.
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IV. Implications
We return to the field of economics, and in particular Cornell's program, to illustrate how the estimates we obtained may be used to help guide university decision-making. As table 3 For example, if the number of PhDs granted per faculty member declined when faculty size increased because there was no increase in support for graduate students, this indirect negative impact would also have to be included in the computation of the change in the ranking.
It should also be noted that larger changes in faculty size will not necessarily lead to simulated proportionately larger changes in a department's relative ranking. This is because the predicted change in the ranking depends both on the predicted change in the rating and the number of schools whose ratings are "closely bunched" around the department. Unless the distribution of program ratings is uniformly distributed, the change in a program's ranking will not necessarily be proportionate to the change in its rating.
The estimated coefficients for economics can also be used to estimate what percentage of the difference between the average absolute rating of the top ten economics departments and Cornell's economics department absolute rating can be "explained" by each of the variables in the model. Given the estimated a R coefficients J for a field, the predicted absolute rating of Cornell's program, « , is given by 8 R^ao+a^ + a^ + ^ajXj,
Similarly, given the means of the characteristics of the top ten schools, the predicted absolute rating for the mean of the top ten schools, The predicted absolute difference in the rating of Cornell and of the mean of the top ten schools that is due to differences in faculty size is thus given by (5a) a,(F m -F e ) + a a (F m 2 -F e 2 ).i3
Similarly, the predicted absolute difference due to differences in any of the other explanatory variables is given by (5b) a^-Xj,) j = 3,4,...8.
To obtain an estimate of the percentage of the actual difference that is "due" to each explanatory variable, one simply divides the estimates from (5a) or (5b) percent is due to Cornell's faculty having lower productivity in doctoral student production, as measured by fewer doctoral students produced per faculty member and longer times-to-degree per student. Crucially, although a smaller faculty size is one of the contributing factors to Cornell's not being ranked among the top ten economics departments, it is not the major factor. Rather, the major factor is the lower research productivity of its faculty.
The fact that Cornell's economists' research productivity, as measured primarily by publications per faculty member and citations per publication, is lower on average than the research productivity of faculty at the top ten economics programs should of course be of concern to the university. 4. In what follows, our focus is on the scholarly quality of the faculty rating. Similar analyses to those described here could obviously be done for the program effectiveness rating. Potential students and university administrators presumably use both ratings in their decision calculus. Here one must assume that the error term, ui, is lognormally distributed, and log represents the natural logarithm. Note that when Ri equals zero the dependent variable in (la) takes on the value of minus infinity, while when Rj equals 5, the dependent variable takes on the value of infinity.
We use equation (1) throughout this paper primarily for expositional convenience. It should be viewed only as a linear approximation to the true nonlinear model. If one were to seriously consider basing resource allocation decisions on the analyses we present in the paper, it would be necessary to see how sensitive our results are to the functional form assumptions. In the appendix, we provide estimates of (la) for economics and illustrate that our specific simulations do not change when this functional form is used.
7. The GINI coefficient is a measure of dispersion. If all faculty members in a program had the same publication level, the GINI coefficient for publications per faculty member would be equal to zero for that program. The greater the dispersion in publications per faculty member, the higher the GINI coefficient will be. For a discussion of how GINI coefficients are calculated, see Goldberger et al. (1995) , p. 56. 9. Models were estimated that both included and excluded the square of faculty size as an explanation variable. If the coefficient of the square of the faculty size variable did not prove to be statistically significantly different from zero at the .10 level (one-tail test), the model that excluded the square of faculty size is reported in Table 2 . As noted above, the negative coefficient of faculty size squared in most fields imply that there is a faculty size in each of those fields that maximizes program rating. However, when computed, these sizes often are larger than the largest program observed. Given the dangers inherent in making projections outside the range of the data observed, we do not report these "optimum" program sizes here.
It may seem strange to talk about significance tests because the observation sets typically consisted of all graduate programs in a field, not just a sampling of programs. However, the ratings themselves are random variables because they come from a sample of raters (typically around 100 per program) and thus contain sampling error. 11. In the few cases that PHDSTU, the ratio of number of doctorates produced during the 1988-1992 period to the number of graduate students enrolled in 1992, was statistically significantly related to the program ratings, the relationship tended to be negative. One interpretation of this finding is that larger values of PHDSTU occur when program size has been contracting and contracting programs are usually not highly rated.
12. The quality of faculty ratings for the 16th through 20th ranked programs in economics are, respectively, California-Lajolla (3.80), New York University 13. For fields in which faculty size does not appear in quadratic form, the second term in (5a) is omitted.
14. Paradoxical to most noneconomists, is that the weaker a department is, the higher the salary that must be paid to talented faculty to attract them to the department. Put another way, to the extent that potential faculty value good colleagues, the better the department, the lower the salary they should be willing to accept. Thus, if market salaries did not differ across fields, one should observe a negative correlation between salaries in a field and departmental quality within a university.
APPENDIX
Appendix Appendix table 2 uses the model found in appendix table 1 to partition the explained difference between Cornell's program's faculty quality rating and the average faculty quality of the top 10 economics programs into percent shares due to faculty size, faculty seniority, faculty research productivity, and faculty productivity in producing new doctorates. When the logit model is used, 70 percent of the difference is "explained" by the model. This 70 percent can be decomposed into 17 percent due to faculty size, 30 percent due to faculty research productivity and 23 percent due to faculty productivity in producing new doctorates. Consistent with the results from the linear model reported in the text, differences in faculty research productivity between Cornell and the top ten schools is again seen to be the most important reason that Cornell's program is not rated in the top 10 in terms of faculty quality. 30 (29) 70% (13) 33% ( .
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